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Abstract
Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impos-
sibility Theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite
do not hold are studied. First, we introduce necessary and sufficient
conditions for a domain to admit non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and
either strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic social choice rules. Next, to
comprehend the limitations the two Theorems imply for social choice
rules, we search for the largest domains that are possible. Put differ-
ently, we look for the minimal restrictions that have to be imposed
on the unrestricted domain to recover possibility results. It turns out
that, for such domains, the conditions of inseparable pair and of in-
separable set yield the only maximal domains on which there exist
non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof social choice rules.
Next, we characterize the maximal domains which allow for Maskin
monotonic, non-dictatorial and Pareto-optimal social choice rules.
1 Introduction
The two most negative results on the decentralization of social choice rules
(henceforth, rules) are, respectively, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gib-
∗Corresponding author: olivier.bochet@vwi.unibe.ch.
†University of Bern and Maastricht University.
‡Maastricht University.
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bard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)) and the Muller-Satterthwaite Theo-
rem (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) theorems.1 The GS Theorem states
that over an unrestricted domain of linear orderings–and with at least three
alternatives– any surjective and strategy-proof rule is dictatorial. On the
other hand, the MS Theorem state that any unanimous and Maskin mono-
tonic is dictatorial.2
It is by now well-understood that the two aforementioned Theorems
strongly rely on the assumption of an unrestricted preference domain. Re-
stricted domains have delivered possibility results on strategy-proof and Maskin
monotonic rules. A striking example is the single-peaked preference domain
(see e.g. Moulin, 1980) for which there exists a huge class of strategy-proof
rules called generalized median voting rules.3,4 Therefore, on the one hand
(i) there is a misperception concerning the robustness of the GS and MS
Theorems, and on the other hand (ii) often the gap between possibility and
impossibility results is not fully understood. This paper is an attempt to
provide some answers –at least partially– to (i) and (ii) above. In order to
do so, we address two fundamental questions. The first one is to know when
a preference domain escapes the negative conclusions of the aforementioned
theorems with non-trivial rules –i.e. rules that are non-dictatorial, Pareto
efficient and strategy-proof/Maskin monotonic. Stated differently, we want
to know when a preference domain is a strategy-proof/Maskin monotonicity
possibility domain. The two necessary and sufficient conditions we uncover
are respectively strategy-proof admissibility and Maskin admissibility. They
can be readily checked for any preference domain at hand. Next, the second
question is to check how much restrictions are needed from the unrestricted
domain to recover a possibility domain. Another way to tackle this question
is the following: how many preference profiles should be removed from the
unrestricted domain in order to get a possibility domain? Therefore, we look
for such domains which are maximal –i.e. there are no supersets of this do-
1Henceforth, we refer to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and the Muller-
Satterthwaite Theorem as GS and MS Theorems respectively.
2Strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are, respectively, necessary conditions for
dominant strategy implementation and Nash implementation. Thus restriction to normal
game forms and uniqueness of dominant strategy/Nash equilibrium outcomes induce that
only trivial rules can be decentralized.
3The class of Maskin monotonic rules on such a domain is somewhat smaller than the
class of strategy-proof rules. See for instance Bochet and Klaus (2008)
4There is a vast literature providing possibility results in various models. We voluntarily
abstract from an extensive overview.
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main on which such rules exist. Such maximal domains indicate a minimal
necessary restriction of the set of profiles and herewith the impact of the so-
called impossibility theorems mentioned above: the smaller these maximal
domains are the more restrictive the properties of the social choice rules of
these impossibility theorems are. The necessary and sufficient conditions we
uncover are –at least for the strategy-proof case– easy to interpret and check.
We should point out that we are indeed not the first one to address the
question of the maximality of domains –at least for the strategy-proof case–
but we depart from the “standard” approach. In the literature, the approach
that is usually followed is to take a “possibility” domain and to find the
maximal enlargement of this domain so that the possibility result still hold.
For instance, this is the case of Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1994);
Barberà, Gul and Stacchetti (1994); Serizawa (1995); Serizawa and Ching
(1998); Berga and Serizawa (2000), or Masso and Neme (2001). Each pa-
per deals with entire restricted domain of preferences. Recently, Puppe and
Tasńdi (2006) study maximal domains over which the Borda count satisfies
Maskin monotonicity. These domains are called cyclically nested permuta-
tion domains. Moreover, as far as we are aware of, this is the only paper along
with ours that deals with maximal domains for non-trivial Maskin monotonic
rules. The key difference between our approach on maximality and the pa-
pers cited above can be (loosely) summarized as follows. The papers using
restricted domains follow a “bottom-to-top” approach. A restricted possi-
bility domain is identified and the question of its maximal enlargement is
investigated. On the other hand, we follow a “top-to-bottom” approach. We
start from GS/MS Theorems and study the minimal restrictions on (unre-
stricted) preferences domains that allow an escape from impossibility results:
how much do we need to restrict the domain in order to get a possibility re-
sult.5 Our approach therefore provides a direct test of the robustness of the
GS and MS Theorems. In that sense, the paper that is closest to ours is
Aswal, Chatterji and Sen (2003) but their approach is antinomic to ours.
While they look for ways to impose restrictions on the unrestricted domain
and still preserve the impossibility result, we look for the opposite. Both
papers show that one may remove exactly the same number of preference
5Closely related but different questions were posed by Kalai and Muller (1977) and
Kalai and Ritz (1980). They study the general conditions for domains which admit the
existence of non-dictatorial Arrow-type social welfare functions. In Kalai and Muller
(1977), the domain restrictions are the same for all agents as there anonymity is one of
the requirements. In Kalai and Ritz (1980), the restricted domains can be asymmetric.
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relation from the domain and obtain an impossibility or a possibility result.
In that sense, the conclusion that the GS Theorem is far more robust than
suggested by the conditions of the theorem itself should be taken with cau-
tion. Both their work and ours show that the robustness of the theorem
is linked to the specific ways in which restriction operations are performed.
For example our results imply that in the three alternatives case, excluding
only one preference relation for only one agent yields a (maximal) domain
which allows for rules that are non-dictatorial, strategy-proof and Pareto ef-
ficient. The same type of conclusion applies to the MS Theorem –although
there is no paper like Aswal, Chatterji and Sen (2003) dealing with Maskin
monotonicity available in the literature.
One way by which domain restrictions escape from the impossibility re-
sults is that the restriction prevents the spreading of decisiveness power. In
many proofs of impossibility results decisiveness of a coalition on one pair of
alternatives spreads to all pairs of alternatives. By deleting specific prefer-
ences this spreading of power is stopped. Restricting the sets of preferences
for different agents may lead to very technical descriptions –see for instance
Examples 7 and 8. To the best of our knowledge there is not a complete re-
sult characterizing all those restricted domains which admit non-dictatorial,
Pareto efficient and strategy-proof/Maskin monotonic rules even if we dis-
regard the maximality of those restrictions. Finding such characterizations
looks very difficult and we are not able at this stage to solve the full ques-
tion –see Examples 7 and 8. We thus concentrate on a partial result and
hope that this will help to solve the general case. Instead of allowing that
any agent’s preference domain can be restricted we restrict the preference
domain of precisely one agent, say agent 1. It will appear that in this way
decisiveness power of the coalition N \ {1} from which only this agent 1 is
excluded is prevented to spread over all pairs. Apart from a simplification we
consider this subclass interesting on its own. It answers the question what
we have to know about one agent independently of the others in order to
obtain a domain on which the impossibility theorems have no bite. Note
that as our results are on maximal possibility domains these results provide
sufficient conditions in case more than one agent preference set is restricted
–see Examples 7 and 8. Clearly this is an asymmetric approach, but the
non-dictatorship conditions allows for asymmetric allocation of decisiveness.
A more symmetric approach at which all the admissible sets of preferences
are the same intuitively seems to fit better to a case where instead of non-
dictatorship anonymity is invoked upon the rule.
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For strategy-proofness, we find that a domain of preferences is a maximal
possibility domain if the restricted set of preferences of agent 1 has an insep-
arable pair or an inseparable set. In case of an inseparable pair, decisiveness
of coalition N \ {1} is restricted to the ”reverse” of this pair where in case
of an inseparable set it is restricted to any pair of alternatives belonging to
this set. For Maskin monotonicity, the characterization of maximal domains
is more intricate but the condition we uncover is similar to the separable
set condition.6 The notion of inseparable pair is well-known in relation with
non-dictatorial Arrow-type welfare functions –see e.g. Kalai and Ritz (1980).
The notion of inseparable set goes at least back to Storcken (1989). Just to
fix idea, let us briefly discuss the notion of inseparable pair. We say that
an agent has an inseparable pair if there exist two alternatives x and y such
that whenever x is ranked best, then y is second-best. The pair (x, y) is
then called inseparable.7 Suppose for instance that a board of managers
has two vacancies. Current members of the board are contemplating several
candidates. Among those are b, a bossy individual, and w a wimp that is
afraid of b. Then, an agent i could rank b at the top and w second because
he expects w to be obedient and to copy b′s decisions–the power of b would
then be increased8. Clearly, agent i has an inseparable pair (b, w). Also a
set of single peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives possesses an
inseparable pair.9
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
and the necessary definitions useful for the paper. In Section 3, we introduce
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of possibility results. In
Section 4 we characterize the maximal domain for non-dictatorial, Pareto
efficient and strategy-proof rules. Next, in Section 5 we characterize the
maximal domain for non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and Maskin monotonic
rules. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in Section 6.
6We explain in more details this technical condition and the intuition for the proof in
Section 5
7The definition of inseparable pair used by Kalai and Ritz (1980) is stronger: it says
that all preferences where x is preferred to y these two are ranked adjacent to each other.
8On the other hand, for different preferences, this agent i may like a strong candidate
but dislike b′s bossiness and w′s obedience. Then, b and w are not necessarily ranked
adjacent to each other because i does not like when the power of b is increased.
9Let m be the number of alternatives. It is not difficult to see that the set of single
peaked preferences contains 2(m−1) preferences and the maximal set of preferences which
has this inseparable pair contains (m − 1) · ((m − 1)!) + ((m − 2)!) preferences. So, the
former set of preferences is only a small fraction of the latter set of preferences.
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2 The model
There is a set of alternatives A = {1, ...,m}, with m > 3 and a set of agents
N = {1, ..., n} with n > 2. Each agent i is endowed with a preference relation
p(i) over the alternatives of A that is (strongly) complete, anti-symmetric
and transitive; that is a preference relation is a linear order over alternatives.
Here for a preference relation, say p(i), we take the usual assumptions that
p(i) is a subset of A× A, the two fold Carthesian product set of A, that for
alternatives x and y we interpret (x, y) ∈ p(i) as agent i weakly prefers x to y
where (x, y) ∈ p(i) and (y, x) /∈ p(i) is interpreted as agent i strictly prefers x
to y. Furthermore, if B is a non-empty subset of alternatives then best(p(i)|B)
denotes the best alternative in B according to agent i’s preference p(i), i.e.
the alternative b in B such that for all x in B either b = x or b is strictly
preferred to x by agent i. Let L(A) denote the set of all these preferences and
L (A)N be the set of possible preference profiles.10 For different alternatives x
and y, x... = p(i) means that x is the best alternative at p(i), ...x...y... = p(i)
means that x is strictly preferred to y at p(i), ...xy... = p(i) means that x
is strictly preferred to y at p(i) and there is no alternative in between these
alternatives x and y and x...y = p(i) means that x is the best alternative
and y is the worst alternative at p(i). Let Lx(A) denote the set of linear
orderings that order x best.
For an arbitrary relation R on A, i.e. R ⊆ A× A, the upper contour of
an alternative x at R is defined as up(x,R) = {y ∈ A : (y, x) ∈ R} and the
lower contour of x at R is defined as low(x,R) = {y ∈ A : (x, y) ∈ R}. The
complement of the upper contour of x at R is non-up(x,R) = A− up(x,R).
To model restrictions of domains of individual preferences let ∅ 6= Li ⊆
L(A) be the domain of individual preferences of agent i ∈ N . From now on,
we assume that Li = L(A) if i > 2 and L1 $ L(A). For each alternative a ∈ A
and set of preferences V ⊆ L(A), let Lia = La(A) ∩ Li and Va = V ∩ La(A).
Let A1 = {a ∈ A : Lia 6= ∅} be the set of alternatives that agent 1 can
order best in at least one of his admissible preferences. Furthermore, let
IA1 = {(x, x) : x ∈ A1} denote the identity relation on A1. For a coalition
M , i.e. a subset of N , and alternatives x, y in A let LMx × LN−My denote the
set of profiles p such that x... = p(i) for all i ∈ M and y... = p(i) for all
10L(A)N denotes the set of all functions from N to L(A). We use this notation rather
than the often used but equivalenet n-fold Carthesian product notation L(A) × L(A) ×
... × L(A) because the restiction of a function to a subdomain used in the definition M -
deviation is a well-known concept and therefore needs no further explanation.
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i ∈ N −M . 11
A rule K is a function from LN to A. For coalitions M and profiles
p, q ∈ LN , the preference profile p is said to be a M -deviation of a profile q
if p|N−M = q|N−M .
We now introduce the main definitions useful for the paper.
Except for intermediate strategy-proofness which can be traced back to
Peters et al. (1991), the following conditions for social choice functions are
well-known. We just rephrase these using the notations at hand.
Non-dictatorship: The social choice function K is non-dictatorial if for
each agent i ∈ N , there is a profile p ∈ LN such that K(p)... 6= p(i).
Pareto optimality: The social choice function K is Pareto optimal if
for each (x, y) ∈ A2 and each p ∈ LN such that for all agents i ∈ N ,
...x...y... = p(i), then K(p) 6= y.
Strategy-proofness:The social choice function K is strategy-proof if for
each agent i ∈ N and each p, q ∈ LN such that q is an {i}-deviation of p, we
have that either K(p) = K(q) or ...K(p)...K(q)... = p(i).
Intermediate strategy-proofness: The social choice function K is in-
termediate strategy-proof if for each coalition M ⊆ N and for each profile
p ∈ LN , such that there is a preference R ∈ L(A) with p(i) = R for all
i ∈ M , and all M -deviations q ∈ LN , it holds that ...K(p)...K(q)... = R or
K(p) = K(q).
This condition means that the social choice function is not beneficial for
coalitional deviations from profile p to profile q where at profile p all members
of the deviating coalition have the same preference. In Theorem 1 it is shown
that intermediate strategy-proofness is equivalent to strategy-proofness on any
(restricted) domain of profiles over linear orderings. It is used as a handy
consequence of strategy-proofness in several proofs.
Maskin monotonicity: The social choice function K is Maskin mono-
tonic if for each p, q ∈ LN ,
low(K(p), p(i)) ⊆ low(K(p), q(i)) for each i ∈ N implies that K(p) = K(q).
11We set L∅x× LNy = LNy and LNx × L∅y = LNx .
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Remark 1 We will use repeatedly in the proofs the connections between the
conditions introduced above: strategy-proofness and intermediate strategy-
proofness are equivalent conditions, whereas the class of strategy-proof rules
is (weakly) smaller than the class of Maskin monotonic rules. We provide a
proof of these connections in the appendix.
Next we introduce four notions by which we can formulate the main
results of this paper.
Strategy-proof possibility domain: A domain LN is called a strategy-
proof possibility domain if there exist rules K : LN → A which are simulta-
neously non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. Furthermore, it
is called a maximal strategy-proof possibility domain if it is a strategy-proof
possibility domain and there is no other strategy-proof possibility domain
say L̂N , such that LN $ L̂N .
Maskin monotonic possibility domain: Similarly we define a Maskin
monotonic possibility domain and a maximal Maskin monotonic possibility
domain by replacing the condition of strategy-proofness by the condition of
Maskin monotonicity in the two previous definitions.
Decisiveness of coalitions appear also in our setting as a powerful tool to
analyze the problem at hand.
Decisiveness: At rule K, a coalition M ⊆ N is said to be decisive on
(x, y) ∈ A×A, if K(p) = x for each profile p ∈ LMx ×LN−My and LMx ×LN−My 6=
∅.
Let DK (M) = {(x, y) ∈ A × A : M is decisive on (x, y)}. If K is
Pareto efficient, then it follows immediately that IA ⊆ DK(M). It ap-
pears that the rules which are non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and strategy-
proofness/Maskin monotonic on the domains at hand are almost dictatorial.
The rules by which it is proved that a domain is a possibility domain are
essentially hierarchical where agent 2 is decisive on any pair in D and agent
1 is decisive on the reversed remaining pairs in A×A1. Let IA $ D $ A×A
for some transitive relation D on A.
Hierarchical rule: Define the hierarchical rule KD corresponding to D
as follows. For each p ∈ LN
KD(p) =
{
best(p(2)|up(y,D)) for each y ∈ A such that up(y,D) 6= ∅ and p(1) ∈ L1y
best(p(1)|A) otherwise.
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Now it is straightforward to see that if the pair (y, x) is in D then agent 2
is decisive on the pair (x, y). Because of D being unequal to both IA and
A× A, it follows that KD is non-dictatorial.
3 Necessary and sufficient conditions for strategy-
proofness and Maskin monotonicity
We are interested in determining conditions on the domain of preferences
that ensure the existence of non-dicatorial, Pareto efficient and strategy-
proof/Maskin monotonic rules. The necessary and sufficient conditions we
uncover have two direct consequences. The first one is that we offer a pos-
sibility to directly check whether a given preference domain is respectively a
strategy-proof or a Maskin monotonic possibility domain.12 The second one
is that in order to escape the impossibilities stated in the GS and the MS
Theorems, it is enough to destroy the product structure of the unrestricted
domain by restricting the set of admissible preference relations of only one
agent, say agent 1. The specific way in which the preferences of agent 1
must be restricted will be the object of the next section where we turn our
attention to the study of maximal domains.
Before proceeding to the results, we introduce in turn our central defini-
tions for this section and we illustrate them with examples.
Strategy-proof admissibility: Let L1 be the set of admissible pref-
erences of agent 1 and let D ⊆ A × A1. The pair (D,L1) is strategy-proof
admissible if
1. IA1 $ D $ A× A1 ,
2. D is transitive and
3. for each (x, y) ∈ D, each p(1) ∈ L1y and each z ∈ up(x, p(1)), both
(z, y) ∈ D and
(x, z) ∈ D whenever L1z 6= ∅.
12These results are stated in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
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Let strategy(D,L1) stands for the strategy-proof admissibility of the pair
(D,L1).
Before going to the definition of Maskin admissibility, it is instructive to
recall the notion of a linked domain introduced in Aswal, Chatterji and Sen
(2003).
Connectedness: Fix a domain of preferences L. A pair of alternatives
x and y are connected, denoted x C y, if there exists p(i), p′(i) ∈ L such that
p(i) = xy..., and p′(i) = yx....
Linkedness: Fix a domain of preferences L. Let B ⊂ A and x /∈ B.
Then x is linked to B if there exists y, z ∈ B such that x C y and x C z.
Linked domain: The domain LN is a linked domain if there exists a
one-to-one function σ : {1, ...,m} → {1, ...,m} such that
(i) xσ(1) C xσ(2)
(ii) xσ(j) is linked to {xσ(1),xσ(2), ..., xσ(j−1)}, j = 3, ...,m.
We compare next the notion of linked domain and of strategy-proof admis-
sibility. Whereas these two notions are antinomic in nature, it is instructive
to grasp some of the differences they entail on preference domains since both
operate on domain restrictions.
Example 1 Let A = {x, y, z} and let the preference domain be L(A). Con-
sider p(i) = xyz. Then xC y since there exists p′(i) = yxz. In addition, z is
linked to {x, y}. This implies that L(A) is linked. Moreover, notice that when
m = 3 there exists no subdomain of L(A) that is linked. Obviously, L(A)N
cannot be a strategy-proof possibility domain. Suppose (y, x) ∈ D. Applying
the definition of strategy-proof admissibility, we get first that (z, x) ∈ D and
(y, z) ∈ D. It is then easy to see that the decisiveness on pairs cannot be
stopped so that D = A× A. 
Example 2 Let A = {x, y, z} and let the preference domain be L = {R ∈
L(A) : if xy... = R then xy... = R′ for each R′ ∈ Lx}. Given Example 1, it
is clear that L cannot be a linked domain. However LN is a strategy-proof
possibility domain. To see this, let (y, x) ∈ D. Since the only preference
relation R ∈ Lx is xyz = R, there exists no alternative z ∈ up(x,R). Hence
D = {(y, x)} ∪ IA. It will be made clear later that domain LN is not a
maximal domain whereas L1 × L(A)N−1 is a maximal domain. 
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Example 2 shows that, when the number of alternatives is three, we only
need to remove one preference relation to recover a possibility result. We
will show in the next section that this observation generalizes: given a set of
alternatives of cardinality m, only (m−1)!−(m−2)! preference relations need
to be removed to obtain a strategy-proof possibility domain. Since Aswal,
Chatterji and Sen (2003) and our paper show ways to restrict domains and
get, respectively, an impossibility and a possibility result, we show in the next
example that both restrictions can lead to the same number of preference
relations being removed. In that sense, the conclusion that the GS Theorem
is far more robust than suggested by the conditions of the theorem itself
should be taken with caution. In our opinion, both their work and ours show
that the robustness of the theorem is linked to the specific ways in which
restriction operations are performed.
Example 3 Let A = {w, x, y, z} and let preference domains be L = {R ∈
L(A) : there exists x, y ∈ A such that if xy... = R then xy... = R′ for each R′ ∈
Lx}; L′ = L \ {Lw, {R ∈ L(A) : ....x = R}}; and L′′ = {R ∈ L(A) :
x C y and both w, z are linked to x, y}. As in Example 2 LN is a strategy-
proof possibility domain. For each i ∈ N , Li contains twenty orderings as
opposed to 4! orderings for L(A). Next it can be checked that L′N ⊂ LN is
a strategy-proof possibility domain while L′′ is a linked domain. Notice that
both L′ and L′′ contain ten orderings. 
We now introduce the notion of Maskin admissibility.
Maskin admissibility: Let L1 be the set of admissible preferences of
agent 1 and let D ⊆ A× A1. The pair (D,L1) is Maskin admissible, if
1. IA1 $ D $ A× A1 ,
2. D is transitive and
3. for all (x, y) ∈ D all p(1) ∈ L1y all z ∈ up(x, p(1)) and all p(1)′ ∈ L1z
both
(z, y) ∈ D and
(x, z) ∈ D whenever low(x, p(1)) ⊆ low(x, p(1)′).
Let Maskin(D,L1) stands for the Maskin admissibility of the pair (D,L1).
We illustrate the notion of Maskin admissibility with several examples.
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Example 4 Let us go back to the set-up of Example 1. By the MS Theorem,
strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent on L(A). This
confirms that D = A×A, thus L(A)N is not a Maskin monotonic possibility
domain. 
Example 5 Let A be ordered with the binary relation >. The domain L
is single-peaked if for each R ∈ L, there exists best(R) such that (i) x >
y > best(R) implies that ..y..x.. = R, and (ii) best(R) > y > x implies that
...y..x.. = R. For simplicity assume that A = {x, y, z}. Let D = {(y, x)}∪IA.
It is easy to see that (D,Li) is Maskin admissible for any i ∈ N so that LN
is a Maskin monotonic possibility domain. 
In the previous two definitions of strategy-proof admissibility and Maskin
monotonic admissibility, (1) implies that KD is non-dictatorial, Condition
(2) imposes some rationality on the decisiveness of agent 2 and together with
(3) it guarantees that KD is strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic. Pareto
efficiency follows from (3) part one.
The following Lemma shows that the condition of strategy-proof ad-
missibility and Maskin admissibility are sufficient to guarantee that KD is
strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic, respectively, and therewith explains the
names of these two requirements on D and L1.
Lemma 1 Consider the hierarchical rule KD : L
N → A, corresponding to
D. Then
1. strategy(D,L1) implies that KD is non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and
strategy-proof;
2. Maskin(D,L1) implies that KD is non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and
Maskin monotonic.
Proof. Non-dictatorship follows in both cases because of IA1 $ D $ A×A1.
To prove Pareto efficiency let p be a profile with p(1) ∈ L1y. It is sufficient to
prove that Pareto efficiency is satisfied at this profile p. This is indeed the
case whenever KD(p) = y. So, suppose that KD(p) = best(p(2)|up(y,D)) and
KD(p) 6= y. Because of strategy(D,L1) as well as Maskin(D,L1), it follows
that z ∈ up(y,D) if there are x ∈ up(y,D) and R ∈ L1y with y...z...x... = R.
So, for all a ∈ non-up(y,D), we have ...KD(p)...a... = p(1) and for all a ∈
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up(y,D) − {KD(p)}, we have ...KD(p)...a... = p(2). So, Pareto efficiency is
satisfied at p.
In order to prove (1), assume strategy(D,L1). Furthermore, let p be as
above and profile q an {i}-deviation of p for some agent i with q(1) ∈ L1z
for some z ∈ A. To the contrary suppose that ...KD(q)...KD(p)... = p(i).
By the definition of KD it follows that i 6 2. If i = 2, then p(1) = q(1).
Consequently, y = z and KD(q) = best(q(2)|up(z,D)) = best(q(2)|up(y,D)). So,
in that case KD(q) ∈ up(y,D). Because KD(p) = best(p(2)|up(y,D)), we ob-
tain a contradiction with ...KD(q)...KD(p)... = p(i). To conclude the proof of
(1), let i = 1. Therefore, p(2) = q(2). Because of ...KD(q)...KD(p)... = p(1)
and strategy(D,L1), it follows that KD(p) ∈ up(KD(q), D). Thus, since
D is transitive, we conclude that KD(p) ∈ up(z,D). But then KD(q) =
best(q(2)|up(z,D)) = best(p(2)|up(z,D)) and ...KD(q)...KD(p)... = p(1) contra-
dict each other. This proves strategy-proofness.
In order to prove (2), assume Maskin(D,L1) and consider {i}-deviations
p and q as before with, in addition, low(KD(p), p(i)) ⊆ low(KD(p), q(i)). It is
sufficient to prove thatKD(p) = KD(q). This obviously holds whenever i > 2.
So suppose that i = 1. Since low(KD(p), p(1)) ⊆ low(KD(p), q(1)), it follows
that z ∈ up(KD(p), p(1)). Maskin(D,L1), or reflexivity of D, or z = y imply
that (KD(p), z) ∈ D and (z, y) ∈ D. Furthermore, transitivity of D implies
that up(z,D) ⊆ up(y,D). But because KD(p) = best(p(2)|up(y,D)), it follows
that KD(p) = best(p(2)|up(y,D)) = best(p(2)|up(z,D)) = best(q(2)|up(z,D)) =
KD(q).
We now prove that the conditions of strategy-proof admissibility and
Maskin admissibility are in fact also necessary to guarantee the existence
of rules that are non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof/Maskin
monotonic. For the rest of this section, let K be a non-dictatorial and Pareto
efficient. We will show that whenever K is strategy-proof or Maskin mono-
tonic, then IA1 $ DK(N − {1}) $ A × A1 is transitive and that the pair
(DK(N−{1}), L1) is respectively strategy-proof admissible or Maskin mono-
tonic admissible.
To avoid needless repetitions, assume that K is at least Maskin mono-
tonic. So, cases at which K is strategy-proof are spelled out explicitly. The
following Lemma formulates a condition when decisiveness at a specific profile
spreads to decisiveness on a specific pair. Actually this condition coincides
with the linking condition of Aswal, Chatterji and Sen (2003) introduced at
the beginning of the section.
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Lemma 2 Let p ∈ LN , M ⊆ N and (x, y) ∈ A×(A\ {x}) such that for each
agent i ∈ M , xy... = p(i) and for each agent i ∈ N −M , y... = p(i). Let
K(p) = x. Then (x, y) ∈ DK(M).
Proof. By the assumptions on p we have that LMx × LN−My 6= ∅. Let
q ∈ LMx × LN−My . It is sufficient to prove that K(q) = x. Let r ∈ LN be
an (N −M)-deviation of p and an M -deviation of q. Now, Pareto efficiency
implies that K(r) ∈ {x, y}. If K(r) = y, then Maskin monotonicity would
imply the contradiction that K(p) = y. Therefore, K(r) = x. But then
Maskin monotonicity implies that K(q) = x.
Lemma 3 IA1 $ DK(N − {1}) $ A× A1 and DK(N − {1}) is transitive.
Proof. (Proof of IA1 $ DK(N − {1})) To the contrary, suppose that IA1 =
DK(N − {1}). We show that this leads to the contradiction that agent 1 is
a dictator. Consider R ∈ L1 and a profile p ∈ LN , with xy... = R = p(1)
for some x and y. To deduce the contradiction, it is sufficient to prove that
K(p) = x. Consider the profiles q and r–both N − {1}-deviations of p–
such that q(i) = yx... and r(i) = y...x for each i > 2. Because of Pareto
efficiency, it follows that K(q) ∈ {x, y}. Now, by Lemma 2, it follows that
K(q) 6= y, otherwise (y, x) ∈ (DK(N − {1})− IA1). But then K(q) = x and
(x, y) ∈ DK({1}). So, K(r) = x. By Maskin monotonicity, we obtain that
K(p) = x.
(Proof of DK(N−{1}) $ A×A1) To the contrary suppose that DK(N−
{1}) = A × A1. We show that this leads to the contradiction that K is
dictatorial. For R ∈ L1, consider the rule KR defined by KR(p) = K(R, p)
for each profile p ∈ L(A)N−{1}. It is clear that KR is surjective–and even
unanimous–and Maskin monotonic. By Lemma 1, it is strategy-proof. Hence,
by the GS Theorem, it follows that KR(p) is dictatorial, say by agent iR > 2.
Consider two preferences R and R′ in L1. In order to prove that K is
dictatorial, it is sufficient to show that iR = iR′ . To the contrary, suppose
that iR 6= iR′ . We deduce a contradiction and are done. Obviously there are
different alternatives x, y, z1, z2, ...zk−1 and zk, where k may be zero, such that
z1z2...zkx... = R and z1z2...zky... = R
′. So x and y are the first alternatives
on which the preferences R and R′ differ. Consider profiles p and q which
are {1}-deviations such that p(1) = R, q(1) = R′, p( iR) = q(iR) = y...
and p(iR′) = q(iR′) = x.... Then since iR is a dictator at K
R, it follows
that K(p) = y and because iR′ is a dictator at K
R′ , it follows that K(q) = x.
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Finally, because low(y,R) ⊆ low(y,R′), we have a contradiction with Maskin
monotonicity of K.
(Proof of transitivity) Let (x, y), (y, z) ∈ DK(N − {1}). It is sufficient
to prove that (x, z) ∈ DK(N − {1}). This is trivially the case when x, y
and z are not three different alternatives. So, let these three alternatives be
different. Let R = z... ∈ L1 arbitrary. Consider p ∈ LN such that p(1) = R
and p(i) = xz... for each i ∈ N − {1}. By Lemma 2, it is sufficient to prove
that K(p) = x. Consider (N − {1})-deviation q of p such that xyz... = q(i)
for all i ∈ N − {1}. If K(q) = y, then Maskin monotonicity would yield
K(r) = y–where r is the {1}-deviation of q with r(1) = y...–which contradicts
(x, y) ∈ DK(N − {1}). If K(q) = z, then Maskin monotonicity would yield
K(u) = z, where u is a (N − {1})-deviation of q, with yz... = u(i) for all
i ∈ N − {1}, which contradicts (y, z) ∈ DK(N − {1}). Therefore K(q) = x
and Maskin monotonicity implies that K(p) = x.
Lemma 4 Let x, y and z be different alternatives and R ∈ L1 such that
y...z.....x... = R. Let (x, y) ∈ DK(N − {1}). Then
1. (z, y) ∈ DK(N − {1});
2. (x, z) ∈ DK(N − {1}) if K is strategy-proof and L1z 6= ∅;
3. (x, z) ∈ DK(N − {1}) if there are R′ ∈ L1z such that low(x,R) ⊆
low(x,R′).
Proof. (Proof of 1 ) Let q ∈ LN such that q(1) = R and zy... = q(i) for
all i ∈ N − {1}. By Lemma 2 it is sufficient to prove that K(q) = z.
Consider p and r, two (N −{1})-deviations of q, such that xzy... = p(i) and
zxy... = r(i) for all i ∈ N − {1}. Because of (x, y) ∈ D(N − {1}), it follows
that K(p) = x. Pareto efficiency implies that K(r) ∈ {y, z}. If K(r) = y,
then Maskin monotonicity would yield the contradiction that K(p) = y.
Therefore, K(r) = z and Maskin monotonicity implies that K(q) = z.
(Proof of 2 ) Suppose K is strategy-proof and z... = R′ ∈ L1z 6= ∅. Let
q ∈ LN such that q(1) = R′ and xz... = q(i) for all i ∈ N − {1}. By Lemma
2, it is sufficient to prove that K(q) = x. Consider (N −{1})-deviations p of
q, with p(1) = R. Because of (x, y) ∈ D(N − {1}), it follows that K(p) = x.
Pareto efficiency implies that K(q) ∈ {x, z}. Now considering p and q, it
follows that K(q) = z would violate strategy-proofness. In consequence,
K(q) = x.
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(Proof of 3 ) Suppose R′ ∈ L1z such that low(x,R) ⊆ low(x,R′). Let
q ∈ LN be such that q(1) = R′ and xz... = q(i) for all i ∈ N−{1}. By Lemma
2, it is sufficient to prove that K(q) = x. Consider (N −{1})-deviations p of
q, with p(1) = R. Because of (x, y) ∈ D(N − {1}), it follows that K(p) = x.
Next, because low(x,R) ⊆ low(x,R′) and Maskin monotonicity, we have
that K(q) = x.
Combining Lemma’s 1, 2, 3 and 4 yields the following corollaries which
are the central results of this section.
Corollary 1 LN is a strategy-proof possibility domain if and only if there
exists i ∈ N such that (DK(N − {i}), Li) is strategy-proof admissible.
Corollary 2 LN is a Maskin monotonic possibility domain if and only if
there exists i ∈ N such that (DK(N − {i}), Li) is Maskin admissible;
4 Maximal domains for strategy-proofness
In the preceeding section, we introduced ways to check whether a given do-
main is respectively a strategy-proof or a Maskin monotonic possibility do-
main. We now study the specific way to make a domain a strategy-proof
possibility domain. Moreover, we look for domain restrictions that are min-
imal. That is the preference domain obtained is a maximal domain: any
enlargement would make the domain to be dictatorial. As emphasized in
the introduction, our approach can thus be seen as the opposite of Aswal,
Chatterji and Sen (2003). Since we already know from the previous section
that the preferences of only one agent need to be restricted in order to obtain
a possibility domain, we assume that L1 ⊂ L(A) while Li = L(A) for each
i 6= 1.
Maximal strategy-proof possibility domains are characterized by the fol-
lowing two inseparability notions.
Inseparable pair: The set of preferences Li has an inseparable pair
(x, y) ∈ A× (A\ {x}) if xy... = R for each R ∈ Lix.
So, the ordered pair of alternatives (x, y) is an inseparable pair of the set of
admissible preferences of agent i if y is ordered second best in all preferences
where x is ordered best. It is already mentioned in the introduction that on a
finite set of alternatives the set of single peaked preferences has an inseparable
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pair. To be more specific on this let the set of alternatives be {a1, a2, ..., am}.
Consider all single peaked preferences with respect to the basic order > with
a1 > a2 > ... > am. That is at such a preference say R there is an alternative
say at such that at...at+1...am... = R and at...at−1...a2...a1... = R. Now both
(a1, a2) and (am, am−1) are inseparable pairs. An other example of set of
preferences with an inseparable pair is as follows. Let there be precisely
three alternatives say a, b and c. Let L1 = L({a, b, c})−{R}, where abc = R.
Then L1 has inseparable pair (a, c).
Inseparable set: Let B be a subset of A, with 3 6 #B < m. The set of
preferences Li has an inseparable set B, with 3 6 #B < m, if for all b ∈ B,
all R ∈ Lib, all a ∈ B and all c ∈ A−B, we have ...a...c... = R .
So, for all preferences R in Li, if the best alternative at R is in B, then
B is preferred to (A − B) at R. Note that this condition trivially holds
for the empty set, any singleton set and the set A itself. Therefore these
are excluded. Furthermore, if B consists of precisely two alternatives, then
having an inseparable set means having two inseparable pairs, which explains
why sets with cardinality 2 are excluded in the definition of inseparable set.
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Corollary 1 characterizes strategy-proof possibility domains in terms of
a set of pairs of alternatives on which the coalition of agents whose sets
of preferences are not restricted are decisive. Consider a non-dictatorial,
Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rule K, such that for all strategy-proof
possibility domains L̂N with LN ⊆ L̂N , we have that LN = L̂N . So, LN is
a maximal strategy-proof possibility domain. We shall prove in Theorem 1
that the conditions on DK(N − {1}) under this maximality property yield
that L1 either has one inseparable pair or one inseparable set. Furthermore,
we deduce that these separabilities are not only necessary but also sufficient.
The following example shows why these inseparabilities imply that a domain
at hand is a strategy-proof possibility domain.
13The notion of inseparable pair used in Kalai and Ritz(1980) states that Li has an in-
separable pair (x, y) if for all R ∈ Li if ...x...y... = R, then ...xy... = R. Here we only need
this inseparability if x is top alternative, because the almost dictatorial choice function
depends mainly on the top alternatives of agent 1, the agent with the restricted preference
set. In Aswal, Chatterji and Sen (2003) it is called the unique seconds property, to em-
phasize its origin we stick to the name as used here. A similar remark as for inseparable
pair holds for inseparable set as defined in Storcken (1989).
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Example 6 In case L1 has an inseparable pair (y, x) or an inseparable set
B, it follows straightforwardly that strategy(D,L1), where D = {(x, y)} ∪
IA or D = (B × B) ∪ IA respectively. So, Lemma 1 implies that in these
situations, the hierarchical rule KD is non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and
strategy-proof. Thus, in that case, LN is a strategy-proof possibility domain.
In the case of an inseparable pair (y, x) and with D = {(x, y)}∪ IA, KD then
simplifies to: For each p ∈ LN
KD(p) =
{
best(p(2)|x,y)) if p(1) ∈ L1y
best(p(1)|A) otherwise.

The following Lemmas are needed for the proof of our first Theorem.
Lemma 5 Let x ∈ A. Then L1x 6= ∅.
Proof. To the contrary let L1x = ∅. Take L̂1 = L1 ∪ {R ∈ L(A) : xy... = R}
for some fixed y ∈ A − {x}. Clearly, by taking L̂i = L(A) for i > 1, we
obtain that LN $ L̂N . By lemma 1, the latter is a strategy-proof possibility
domain. This yields a contradiction with LN being maximal.
Intuitively it is reasonable that the smaller the set of decisive pairs of
N − {1}, the larger L1 can be taken. The following Lemma shows that we
may shrink the set of decisive pairs of N − {1}.
Lemma 6 Let (x∗, y∗) ∈ DK(N − {1}), with x∗ 6= y∗.
Take
Y = {a ∈ A : a = y∗or(a, y∗), (y∗, a) ∈ DK(N − {1})} and,
Z = {a ∈ A : (a, y∗) ∈ DK(N − {1})and(y∗, a) /∈ DK(N − {1})}.
Let D∗ = [(Z × Z) ∪ (Z × Y ) ∪ (Y × Y ) ∪ IA] ∩DK(N − {1}).
Then strategy(D∗, L1). Furthermore, [(Z×Y )∪ (Y ×Y )∪ IA] ⊆ DK(N −
{1}).
Proof. By definition (x∗, y∗) ∈ D∗ − IA and D∗ ⊆ DK(N − {1}). So,
IA $ D∗ $ A × A. Because of transitivity of DK(N − {1}) and [(Z × Z) ∪
(Z ×Y )∪ (Y ×Y )∪ IA] it follows that D∗ is transitive. Let x, y, z ∈ A, with
#{x, y, z} = 3. Let (x, y) ∈ D∗. Let y...z...x... = R in L1. It is sufficient to
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prove that (z, y) ∈ D∗ and (x, z) ∈ D∗. Because of strategy(DK(N−{1}), L1)
and Lemma 5, it follows that (x, z), (z, y) ∈ DK(N − {1}). Moreover, by
transitivity of DK(N − {1}) and the definition of Y and Z, it follows that
DK(N − {1}) ∩ (Y × Z) = ∅. Thus, it is sufficient to prove that z ∈ Y ∪ Z.
Because of y ∈ Y ∪ Z, it follows that (y, y∗) ∈ DK(N − {1}). However,
(z, y) ∈ DK(N − {1}) and transitivity of DK(N − {1}) together imply that
(z, y∗) ∈ DK(N − {1}). Therefore, z ∈ Y ∪ Z.
The furthermore part follows by transitivity of DK(N − {1}) and the
definition of Y and Z.
Lemma 7 There are disjoint subsets Y and Z of A such that
1. Y is non-empty, Y ∪ Z 6= A, and #(Y ∪ Z) > 2;
2. IA $ [((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA] ⊆ DK(N − {1}) $ A× A and
3. strategy(((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA, L1).
Proof. In Lemma 6, we proved that there are disjoint Y and Z such that
strategy([(Z ×Z)∪ (Z × Y )∪ (Y × Y )∪ IA]∩DK(N −{1}), L1). Because of
the transitivity of DK(N − {1}), we may take (x∗, y∗) ∈ DK(N − {1}) such
that x∗ 6= y∗ and (Z × Z) ∩DK(N − {1}) ⊆ IA. By the furthermore part of
the previous Lemma 6, we obtain that (Y ∪Z)× Y ⊆ DK(N −{1}). Hence,
it follows that strategy(((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA, L1). The inclusions at (2) follow
readily.
Also, by definition, Y is non-empty and because of x∗, y∗ ∈ Y ∪ Z, with
x∗ 6= y∗, we have #(Y ∪ Z) > 2.
It remains to prove that Y ∪ Z 6= A. In order to do so, suppose that
Y ∪ Z = A. We prove that we may take Z = ∅ and that Y 6= A. Consider
y ∈ Y and R = y...a in L1 where a ∈ A. Because of strategy(((Y ∪Z)×Y )∪
IA, L
1) and (a, y) ∈ ((Y ∪ Z) × Y ), it follows for each b ∈ A − {y, a} that
(a, b) ∈ ((Y ∪ Z)× Y ). Hence, b ∈ Y for each b ∈ A− {a, y}. Next, because
[((Y ∪ Z) × Y ) ∪ IA] $ A × A, it follows that Z 6= ∅. But then Z = {a}.
As the previous holds for every a′ ∈ A for which there are y ∈ Y , R ∈ L1y
with y...a′ = R and Z is a singleton, it follows that for each y ∈ Y and each
R ∈ L1y that y...a = R. Hence, strategy((Y × Y ) ∪ IA, L1) and as Z is a
singleton Y 6= A. By taking Z = ∅ this shows the existence of such Y and
Z.
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Theorem 1 Let LN be such that Li = L(A) for all i > 2. Then LN is a
maximal strategy-proof possibility domain if and only if one of the following
two conditions holds
1. There are a, b ∈ A with a 6= b and L1 = V where V = {R ∈ L(A) : if
R ∈ L1a, then ab... = R} which means that L1 has an inseparable pair
(a, b);
2. There is a non-trivial subset Y of A, with #Y > 3, such that L1 = W
where W = {R ∈ L(A) : if R ∈ L1y for some y ∈ Y , then for all a ∈ Y
and all b ∈ A− Y we have ...a...b... = R} which means that L1 has an
inseparable set Y .
Proof. (Only-if-part) Suppose L1 is a maximal strategy-proof possibility
domain. By the previous Lemma there are disjoint subsets Y and Z of A
such that
1. Y is non-empty, Y ∪ Z 6= A, and #(Y ∪ Z) > 2;
2. IA $ [((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA] $ A× A and
3. strategy(((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA, L1).
Consider y ∈ Y and z, t ∈ Y ∪ Z. Take R ∈ L1y which exist by Lemma
5 and assume without loss of generality that y...t...z... = R. Then by strat-
egy(((Y ∪ Z) × Y ) ∪ IA, L1), it follows that (z, t) ∈ (Y ∪ Z) × Y . Hence,
t ∈ Y . So, #Z 6 1. Moreover, if z ∈ Z, then for all t ∈ Y − {y}, we
have y...t...z... = R. Because y is chosen arbitrarily, this means that strat-
egy((Y × Y ) ∪ IA, L1) or #Y = #Z = 1. Suppose Y = {b} and Z = {a}.
Then strategy(((Y ∪Z)×Y )∪IA, L1) implies that L1 has an inseparable pair
(a, b). Consider the set V . We shall prove L1 = V . Because obviously strat-
egy(((Y ∪Z)×Y )∪IA, V ) and therefore strategy(((Y ∪Z)×Y )∪IA, L1∪V ) it
follows by the maximality of L1 that V ⊆ L1. Now V is defined such that it
contains all sets of preferences which have an inseparable pair (a, b). There-
fore L1 ⊆ V . So, L1 = V . Now suppose strategy((Y × Y ) ∪ IA, L1). Then it
follows that L1 has an inseparable set Y . Consider the set W . By proving
that L1 = W, we end the proof of the only-if-part. Because obviously strat-
egy((Y ×Y )∪IA,W ) and therefore obviously strategy((Y ×Y )∪IA, L1∪W ),
it follows by the maximality of L1 that W ⊆ L1. But W is defined such that
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is contains all sets of preferences which have an inseparable set Y . Therefore
L1 ⊆ V . So, L1 = W .
(If-part) By example 6 it is clear that if L1 equals either V or W , then LN
is a strategy-proof possibility domain. It remains to prove the maximality
of it. Suppose Li ⊆ L̂i for all agents i and L̂N is a maximal strategy-proof
possibility domain. It is sufficient to prove that LN = L̂N . By the only-if-
part, it follows that L̂1has either an inseparable set say Ŷ or an inseparable
pair say (â, b̂). Because L1 ⊆ L̂1 and is such that it contains all sets of
preferences which either have an inseparable set Y or an inseparable pair
(a, b), it follows that the inseparable sets or pairs are equal and that L1 = L̂1.
Remark 2 In Theorem 1 we used hierarchical rules to show that a domain
with an inseparable pair or set is a strategy-proof possibility domain. In fact
any rule K such that DK(N − {1}) is either equal to {(x, y)} ∪ IA or equal
to (B × B) ∪ IA for some different alternatives x and y or for a non-trivial
subset B of A with at least three alternatives can be used here. For instance
in case DK(N − {1}) = {(x, y)} ∪ IA one might define K non-hierarchically
as follows. For all profiles p in LN
KD(p) =
{
x if best(p(1)|A) = y and ...x...y... = p(i) for some i 6= 1
z in all other cases where z = best(p(1)|A).
5 Maximal domains for Maskin monotonicity
In this section we characterize the maximal Maskin monotonic possibility do-
mains for the case that precisely one agent’s set of preferences is restricted.
Our next Theorem spells out a characterization of Maskin monotonic possi-
bility domains in terms of a set of pairs of alternatives on which the coalition
of agents whom sets of preferences are not restricted are decisive.
Not surprisingly, the characterization of maximal domains is more in-
tricate than in the strategy-proof case. It relies on the existence of disjoint
subsets Y and Z of the sets of alternative and the existence of an asymmetric
and transitive relation P on the set of alternatives. Now coalition N − {1}
is decisive on all pairs in Y and all pairs (z, y) such that z is in Z and y is in
Y . To achieve that this decisiveness does not spread further it is on the one
hand required that at all admissible preferences for agent 1, with the best
alternative in Y , all alternatives in subset Y ∪ Z are preferred to all those
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not in this union. Actually this requirement follows from condition (a) of
Theorem 2 and part 1 of condition (d) of this Theorem introduced below.14
This condition is similar to the separable set condition. As this is the only
requirement on the set Y it is not necessarily ”separated” from Z. That is
there may be alternatives z in Z which are preferred to an alternative in Y
at a preference with its best element in Y . Therefore on the other hand it is
required that decisiveness on a pair (z, y) or (y′, y) cannot spread to a pair
(z, z′) or to a pair (y, z′) for alternatives z and z′ in Z and y and y′ in Y .
Now part 2 of condition (d) in Theorem 2 essentially takes care that, in these
situations, Maskin monotonicity has no bite.
Remark 3 Consider Lemmas 5’, 6’ and 7’ obtained from Lemmas 5, 6 and
7 by replacing the word ”strategy” by the word ”Maskin” respectively . The
proofs of these Lemma’s follow likewise by the same substitution in the proofs
of the original Lemma’s. To avoid obvious repetitions neither the Lemma’s
5’, 6’ and 7’ nor their proofs are written out here.
Theorem 2 Let LN be such that Li = L(A) for all i > 2. Then LN is
a maximal Maskin monotonic possibility domain if, and only if, there are
disjoint subsets Y and Z of A and an asymmetric and transitive relation P
on A such that
a Y is non-empty, Y ∪Z 6= A, #(Y ∪Z) > 2 and [(Y ∪Z)×(A−(Y ∪Z))] ⊆
P ⊆ [(Y ∪ Z)× (A− Y )];
b if L1 has a separable pair (b, a) then Y = {b} and Z = {a};
c there is no partition X1, X2 of Y ∪Z with #X1 > 2 and X1×X2 ⊆ P and
d L1 = V where V = {R ∈ L(A) :
1. if y... = R for some y ∈ Y , then P ⊆ R;
2. if z... = R for some z ∈ Z, then there are t ∈ A − (Y ∪ Z) such
that [(non-up(z, P )− {z}) ∩ (Y ∪ Z)] ⊆ low(t, R)}.
14These two yield (Y ∪ Z) × Y ⊆ P ⊆ R, where R is such an admissible preference of
agent 1 with best element in Y .
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Proof. (Only-if-part) Let LN be a maximal Maskin monotonic possibility
domain. We will show the existence of sets Y , Z and relation P satisfying
the conditions formulated in the theorem. By Lemma 7’ we have Y , Z ⊆ A,
where Y ∩ Z = ∅, Y 6= ∅, Y ∪ Z 6= A, #(Y ∪ Z) ≥ 2 and Maskin(((Y ∪
Z)× Y ) ∪ IA, L1). For different alternatives a and b, define (a, b) ∈ P if for
all R ∈ L1y and all y ∈ Y we have that ...a...b... = R. By definition, P is
asymmetric and because the preferences in L1are transitive, P is transitive.
Because of Maskin(((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA, L1), it follows that [(Y ∪ Z)× (A−
(Y ∪ Z))] ⊆ P . Because of the definition of P and Lemma 5’ it follows that
P ⊆ [(Y ∪ Z)× (A− Y )]. This proves part (a).
Claim 1 Maskin(((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA, V ).
We have to prove the following implications for x, y, z ∈ A and R,R′ ∈ V .
1. If (x, y) ∈ (Y ∪Z)× Y and y...z...x... = R, then (z, y) ∈ (Y ∪Z)× Y ;
2. If (x, y) ∈ (Y ∪ Z) × Y , y...z...x... = R, z... = R′ and low(x,R) ⊆
low(x,R′), then (x, z) ∈ (Y ∪ Z)× Y .
The proof of the first implication follows immediately from the first con-
dition in the definition of V and [(Y ∪Z)× (A− (Y ∪Z))] ⊆ P . To prove the
second implication, let x, y, z, R and R′ be as in the premises of implication
2. It is sufficient to prove that low(x,R) " low(x,R′) or (x, z) ∈ (Y ∪Z)×Y .
Clearly by implication 1, it follows that z ∈ (Y ∪Z). If z ∈ Y , then evidently
(x, z) ∈ (Y ∪ Z) × Y . So, suppose z /∈ Y , which implies that z ∈ Z. Now
because of P ⊆ R and the definition of P , it follows that (x, z) /∈ P . Of
course x 6= z . So, there are t ∈ A− (Y ∪ Z) such that x ∈ low(t, R′). Now,
since t ∈ A − (Y ∪ Z), it follows that y...x...t... = R. Thus, low(x,R) "
low(x,R′). This proves the second implication and ends the proof of the
claim.
Next we prove part (b). Let L1 have an inseparable pair (b, a). In view of
Example 6, Theorem1 and L1 being a maximal Maskin monotonic possibility
domain, it follows for all x ∈ A−{b} that Lx(A) ⊆ L1and L1b = {R ∈ L(A) :
ba... = R}. So, for (x, y) 6= (a, b), with x 6= y, there are R ∈ L1 such that
y...x = R. Now, (x, y) ∈ (Y ∪Z)×Y would, by Maskin(((Y ∪Z)×Y )∪IA, L1),
imply that {x}×A ⊆ ((Y ∪Z)×Y ) and therewith the contradiction A ⊆ Y .
In consequence, ((Y ∪ Z) × Y ) = {(a, b)}. Hence, {a} = Z and {b} = Y .
This completes the proof of part (b).
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In order to prove (c) let X1 and X2 be a partition of Y ∪Z with #X1 > 2
and X1×X2 ⊆ P . It is sufficient to prove that this contradicts the maximality
of LN . Then IA ∪ [X1 × (Y ∩ X1)] $ A × A and IA ∪ [X1 × (Y ∩ X1)] is
transitive. By the definition of P it follows that X1 ∩ Y 6= ∅. Consider y ∈
X1 ∩ Y and x ∈ X2. Then (x, y) ∈ (Y ∪ Z) × Y . Let R ∈ L1y and let
R′ ∈ L(A) be such that R|A−{x} = R′|A−{x} and y...x = R′. Then R′ ∈ L1
and Maskin(((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA, L1) would imply {x} ×A ⊆ ((Y ∪ Z)× Y )
which then contradicts Y ∪Z 6= A. So, R′ /∈ L1. But obviously Maskin((X1×
(Y ∩X1))∪ IA, L1 ∪{R′}) which contradicts the maximality of LN . Next we
prove (d).
First we prove L1 ⊆ V . Let R ∈ L1. Then (1) follows because of the
definition of P . In order to show that also (2) is satisfied let z... = R. Let T =
(non-up(z, P )−{z})∩ (Y ∪Z). Take x = best(R|T ). So x ∈ T and for some
y ∈ Y there are R′ in L1 with y...z...x... = R′. Because of z ∈ Z, it follows
that (x, z) /∈ ((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA. Therefore Maskin(((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA, L1)
implies low(x,R′) * low(x,R). So, there are t ∈ low(x,R′) and x ∈ low(t, R).
Because of the definition of x and the fact that x ∈ low(t, R), it follows
that t /∈ T . But then, because t ∈ low(x,R′), it follows that t ∈ non-
up(z, P ) − {z}. Now, because t /∈ T, it implies that t /∈ (Y ∪ Z). So,
t ∈ A− (Y ∪ Z) and T ⊆ low(t, R) which in turn yields (2).
Next we prove that V ⊆ L1. Because of L1 ⊆ V and the maximality of
L1, it is sufficient to prove that V is a Maskin monotonic possibility domain.
So, by Corollary 1 it is sufficient to prove that Maskin(((Y ∪Z)×Y )∪IA, V ),
which follows by the previous claim. This completes the proof of part (d)
and herewith the only if part.
(If-part) Let Y , Z, P and V as formulated in the if part of the theorem.
Let L1 = V . It is sufficient to prove that LN is a Maskin monotonic possibility
domain and that for all Maskin possibility domains L̂N with V ⊆ L̂1 and
L̂i = L(A), we have that V = L̂1. Note that P = {(a, b) ∈ A×A : a 6= b and
for all y ∈ Y and allR ∈ L1y ...a...b... = R}. By Claim 1 we have Maskin(((Y ∪
Z) × Y ) ∪ IA, L1). Setting D of Lemma 1 equal to ((Y ∪ Z) × Y ) ∪ IA, it
follows that LN is a Maskin monotonic possibility domain. Therefore it is
sufficient to prove that there are no IA $ D′ $ A × A and V $ W ⊆ L(A)
with Maskin(D′,W ). To the contrary, let there be such D′ and W . Without
loss of generality we may assume that W is a maximal Maskin monotonic
possibility domain. By the only-if-part, we may assume the existence of
disjoint Y ′, Z ′ ⊆ A with Y ′ 6= ∅, Y ′ ∪ Z ′ 6= A, an asymmetric and transitive
relation P ′ on A with [(Y ′∪Z ′)×(A−(Y ′∪Z ′))] ⊆ P ′ ⊆ [(Y ′∪Z ′)×(A−Y ′)],
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#(Y ′ ∪Z ′) > 2, if L1has a separable pair (b, a) then Y ′ = {b} and Z ′ = {a},
there is no partition X ′1, X
′
2 of Y
′ ∪ Z ′ with #X ′1 > 2, X ′1 × X ′2 ⊆ P ′ and
W = {R ∈ L(A) :
1. if y... = R for some y ∈ Y ′, then P ′ ⊆ R;
2. if z... = R for some z ∈ Z ′, then there are t′ ∈ A− (Y ′ ∪ Z ′) such that
for all x′ ∈ Y ′ ∪ Z ′, with x′ 6= z and (x′, z) /∈ P ′, x′ ∈ low(t′, R)}.
Now by Claim 1 it follows that Maskin(((Y ′∪Z ′)×Y ′)∪IA,W ). Because
of V ⊆ W , this implies Maskin(((Y ′∪Z ′)×Y ′)∪ IA, V ). Next we prove that
(((Y ′ ∪ Z ′)× Y ′) ∪ IA) = (((Y ∪ Z)× Y ) ∪ IA).
First, we prove that (((Y ′ ∪ Z ′) × Y ′) ∪ IA) ⊆ (((Y ∪ Z) × Y ) ∪ IA).
It is sufficient to prove that Y ′ ∪ Z ′ ⊆ Y ∪ Z and that Y ′ ⊆ Y . In order
to prove the former let x ∈ A − (Y ∪ Z). It is sufficient to show that
x /∈ Y ′ ∪ Z ′. Clearly by the definition of V it follows that Lx(A) = Vx.
Because of V ⊆ W , it follows that Vx ⊆ Wx. Hence, Lx(A) = Wx. Suppose
x ∈ Y ′. Then there are z ∈ (Y ′ ∪ Z ′) − {x} and R ∈ Lx(A) = Wx such
that x...z = R. Now by the assumptions on Y ′,Z ′,P ′ and W we have that
(Y ′ ∪ Z ′) × (A − (Y ′ ∪ Z ′)) ⊆ P ⊆ R. As x...z = R, x ∈ Y ′ and z ∈
Y ′ ∪ Z ′ this can only hold if A = Y ′ ∪ Z ′ which contradicts our assumptions
on Y ′,Z ′,P ′ and W . Suppose x ∈ Z ′. Then there are R ∈ Lx(A) = Wx such
that (Y ′∪Z ′)× (A− (Y ′∪Z ′)) ⊆ R. Now as there are t ∈ A− (Y ′∪Z ′) such
that ((non-up(x, P ′) − {x}) ∩ (Y ′ ∪ Z ′)) ⊆ low(t, R) it follows that ((non-
up(x, P ′)−{x})∩(Y ′∪Z ′)) = ∅. As there is no partition X ′1 and X ′2 of Y ′∪Z ′
such that X ′1 × X ′2 ⊆ P ′ and #X ′1 ≥ 2 we have Y ′ = {y} and Z ′ = {x}.
Hence (y, z) is an inseparable pair in W and therewith as well in V . This
however leads by (b) to the contradiction Y = Y ′ = {y} and Z = Z ′ = {x}.
In order to prove Y ′ ⊆ Y let y ∈ Y ′. To the contrary assume y /∈ Y . Then
by the inclusion Y ′∪Z ′ ⊆ Y ∪Z we may conclude that y ∈ Z and that there
are t ∈ (A− (Y ∪Z)) ⊆ (A− (Y ′∪Z ′)). Furthermore, there are R ∈ Vy with
yt... = R. As V ⊆ W , it follows that R ∈ Wy where y ∈ Y ′. But yt... = R
with t ∈ A − (Y ′ ∪ Z ′) contradicts [(Y ′ ∪ Z ′) × (A − (Y ′ ∪ Z ′))] ⊆ P ⊆ R.
Hence, Y ′ ⊆ Y .
Next we prove (((Y ∪Z)×Y )∪IA) ⊆ (((Y ′∪Z ′)×Y ′)∪IA). By the proof
of the previous inclusion, we may assume that both (Y ′ ∪Z ′) ⊆ (Y ∪Z) and
Y ′ ⊆ Y .
First we show that Y = Y ′. To the contrary let b ∈ Y − Y ′. Now for
all c ∈ Y ′ ⊆ Y, there are preferences R and R′ in V such that cb... = R and
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bc... = R′. If b /∈ (Y ′ ∪ Z ′), then R ∈ V ⊆ W violates condition 1 of W .
So, b ∈ (Y ′ ∪ Z ′) which means that b ∈ Z ′. Because of R ∈ W, it follows
that (x, b) /∈ P ′ for all x ∈ A − {c, b}. Now, because R′ ∈ W ,in view of
condition 2 of W it follows that (c, b) ∈ P ′. Note that for all x ∈ Y − {b, c},
there are preferences R′′ = xbc... in V ⊆ W . So, because of (c, b) ∈ P ′,
it follows that Y ′ = {c}. Since {c, b} ⊆ Y , it follows that (c, b) is not an
inseparable pair in V . Therefore, there are x ∈ A − {c, b} and preferences
R′′′ = cx...b... in V ⊆ W . Then Maskin(((Y ′ ∪ Z ′) × Y ′) ∪ IA,W ) implies
x ∈ (Y ′ ∪ Z ′). As Y ′ = {c} this yields x ∈ Z ′. Because of R′′′ ∈ V and
c ∈ Y , it follows that (y, x) /∈ P for all y ∈ A − {c, x}. But then, there are
preferences R′′′′ = bcx... in V ⊆ W . Note that although b, x ∈ Z ′ and (x, b) /∈
P ′, there is no t′ ∈ A − (Y ′ ∪ Z ′) such that b...t′...x... = R′′′′ contradicting
condition 2 of W . In consequence, Y = Y ′.
In the following, we prove that Y ∪ Z = Y ′ ∪ Z ′. To the contrary let
Y ∪Z 6= Y ′ ∪Z ′. We will prove that [(Y ′ ∪Z ′)× ((Y ∪Z)− (Y ′ ∪Z ′))] ⊆ P
which because of #(Y ′ ∪ Z ′) > 2 clearly contradicts the assumptions on P .
So let x′ ∈ (Y ′ ∪ Z ′) and let z ∈ ((Y ∪ Z) − (Y ′ ∪ Z ′)). Because of Y = Y ′
it follows that z ∈ Z − Z ′. Suppose to the contrary that (x′, z) /∈ P . Then
there are y′ ∈ Y and R ∈ V with y′...z...x′... = R. As Y = Y ′ both x′ and y′
are in (Y ′ ∪ Z ′) Maskin(((Y ′ ∪ Z ′)× Y ′) ∪ IA,W ) implies the contradiction
z ∈ (Y ′∪Z ′). So, (x′, z) ∈ P and herewith [(Y ′∪Z ′)×((Y ∪Z)−(Y ′∪Z ′))] ⊆
P .
So, Y = Y ′ and Z = Z ′. Next we show that P = P ′ which then by
the definition of V and W yields the desired result that V = W . First we
show that P ⊆ P ′. To the contrary, suppose that (a, b) ∈ P and (a, b) /∈ P ′.
Because P∪ P ′ ⊆ [(Y ∪Z)×(A−Y )] and ((Y ∪Z)×(A−(Y ∪Z))) ⊆ P ∩P ′,
it follows that a ∈ Y ∪ Z and b ∈ Z. Now because of the definition of V
there are R ∈ V with bat... = R for some t ∈ (A− (Y ∪ Z)). Since V ⊆ W ,
this clearly yields a contradiction with condition 2 of W . So, P ⊆ P ′.
Next we prove P ′ ⊆ P . Suppose (a, b) /∈ P . We prove that (a, b) /∈ P ′.
Because (a, b) /∈ P it follows by the definition of V that there are R ∈ V
such that both y... = R for some y ∈ Y and ...b...a... = R. As R ∈ V ⊆ W .
This shows that (a, b) /∈ P ′.
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6 Conclusion
By restricting the domain of only one agent, we showed that it is possible to
escape the negative conclusions of the GS and the MS theorems. Obviously,
the rules that are non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof/Maskin
monotonic have a dictatorship flavor since, at many preference profiles, the
agent with a restricted set of preferences gets his top alternative. A open
question of interest would be to study how these rules evolve as we restrict
the preferences of more than one agent. We close the discussion with two
examples showing that tackling this question may be a non-trivial hurdle.
The first example shows that if we restrict the sets of preferences of exactly
two agents, then neither the condition of inseparable pair nor the condition of
inseparable set is a necessary condition for the maximality of a strategy-proof
possibility domain.
Example 7 Let A = {w, x, y, z} and N = {1, 2}. Take L1 = {R ∈ L(A) :
R = x... or R = y...x...z... or R = w...x...z...or R = z...} and L2 = {R ∈
L(A) : R = x...z...w... or R = y...w...x... or R = z...x or R = w...y...x...}.
Now define the rule K as follows. For each p ∈ LN ,
K(p) =
{
a if p(1) = a... and p(2) = b... and (a, b) /∈ {(y, x), (w, x)}
x otherwise.
So at K agent 2 is decisive on the pairs (x, y) and (x,w) whereas agent
1 is decisive on the remaining pairs. So K is not dictatorial. As K(p)
∈ {best(p(1)), best(p(2))} we have that K is Pareto efficient. To see that K
is strategy-proof consider profiles p with p(2) = x.... Then the outcome for
any {1}-deviation of p is either x or z depending on whether agent 1 prefers
x to z or z to x respectively. A similar reasoning holds for {2}-deviation of
profile p with p(1) = y... or p(1) = w.... It is straight forward to see that for
both agents i the set Li does not have an inseparable pair or set. By which
we may conclude that these inseparabilities are not necessary conditions for
maximal strategy-proof possibility domains in case the set of preferences of
more than one agent is restricted. Note further that K is tops-only. 
The following and last example show a strategy-proof possibility domain
for two agents with the same set of admissible preferences. Also in this case
these sets are not containing an inseparable pair or set. Moreover the social
choice rule which is discussed in this example is not tops-only.
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Example 8 Let A = {w, x, y, z} and N = {1, 2}. Take L1 = L2 = {R ∈
L(A) : R = xywz or R = xw... or R = yzwx or R = yw... or R = zxwy
or R = zw... or R = w...}. Note that at every profile there is at most one
alternative different from w which is strictly preferred to it by both agent 1
and 2 simultaneously.
Let rule K be defined as follows. For each p ∈ LN ,
K(p) =
{
a if there exists a such that p(1) = ..a..w.. and p(2) = ..a..w..
w otherwise.
Since this rule treats agents symmetrically, it is non-dictatorial. Given the
special position of w, K is also Pareto efficient. In general such imputation
social choice correspondences on unrestricted domains are strategy-proof if
the outcome sets are compared on their best alternatives only. But then as
K yields a singleton at each of the profiles in the restricted domain at hand,
we have as a consequence that it is strategy-proof. Notice that this set of ad-
missible preferences does neither have an inseparable pair nor an inseparable
set. 
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7 Appendix
Proposition 3 Let K : LN → A be a social choice function. Then
1. K is strategy-proof if and only if it is intermediate strategy-proof;
2. If K is strategy-proof, then it is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. (First part) Clearly intermediate strategy-proofness implies strategy-
proofness. So, suppose K is strategy-proof. Furthermore, let p and q be
S-deviations for some S ⊆ N such that p(i) = R for some R ∈ L(A). It is
sufficient to proof that ...K(q)...K(p)... 6= R. Without loss of generality let
S = {1, 2, ..., s}. Take profiles r0, r1, r2, ..., rs ∈ LN defined for all i ∈ N by
rt(i) = p(i) if i > t, and by rt(i) = q(i) otherwise. So, r0 = p and rs = q. By
strategy-proofness, it follows that ...K(rt+1)...K(rt)... 6= rt(t+ 1) = R for all
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., s − 1}. Because of negative transitivity of R, it follows that
...K(q)...K(p)... 6= R.
(Second part) Let p and q be {i}-deviations in LN such that,
low(K(p), p(i)) ⊆ low(K(p), q(i)).
It is sufficient to prove that K(p) = K(q). By strategy-proofness it follows
that K(q) ∈ low(K(p), p(i)) and K(p) ∈ low(K(q), q(i)). Given our assump-
tion, we have that K(q) ∈ low(K(p), q(i)) and K(p) ∈ low(K(q), q(i)). As
q(i) is antisymmetric we have that K(p) = K(q).
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